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Elite Conflict Orientations in Polish
and US Cities
SAMUEL J. ELDERSVELD AND RENATA SIEMIENSKA
ABSTRACT. This paper analyzes the values of local leaders in Poland and
the United States. A matched subset of cities is used. Interview data were
collected in the 1983-84 period. The focus is on elite views about political
conflict. Striking differences were found in the types of problems seen as
serious in their communities. Yet, similar proportions perceived and
tolerated conflicts today as in 1966. Individual level data on leadership
position, party affiliation or status, length of tenure and age revealed
differences. And in both countries community differences were considerable.
Elite values, particularly the extent of elite value consensus, constitute an important
focus in the analysis of any political system. Elite orientations toward social and
political conflict constitute a particularly relevant aspect of such analysis. Scholars
have from time to time reflected on elite conflict perceptions and beliefs, and there
has been some empirical research in this area. What we don’t know very much about
are the cross-national patterns of elite conflict orientations and the factors which seem
to be linked to such orientations. In this paper we explore this problem with data
from two &dquo;most different&dquo; systems, Poland and the United States. The data we use
are based on interviews completed between 1982 and 1984 with local political and
governmental leaders in five Polish cities and seven US cities of similar size. The
exploratory analysis of the data presented here we hope will help us better understand
community political systems, and their political leadership, in these two nations.
More specifically, our aims are to:
1. Describe local leaders’ awareness of conflicts in Poland and the United States,
their evaluations of the impact of such conflicts (whether harmful or salutary),
and their personal predispositions (or value preferences) about conflict. These, in
a sense, are our three &dquo;dependent&dquo; phenomena.
2. Analyze the factors underlying, and presumably linked to, these elite orientations,
relying on individual variables and exploring also the possible relevance of
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community differences. Our explicit interest here is to see whether such variables
help explain cross-national elite views on conflict.
3. Assess the meaning of these findings in the light of conflict theory generally, and
in the context of the earlier crossnational findings reported in the &dquo;International
Study of Values in Politics&dquo; (Jacob et al., 1971).
There are, of course, several assumptions underlying this earlier research, as well
as the analysis presented here. We assume that the cognitions, perceptions, and
evaluations of elites regarding social and political conflict are important orientations,
and that if we can discover and understand them (we assume we can study them!)
they will provide us with better knowledge about elite behavior and the nature of
political life in the communities we study. They are presumably not transient, nor
situational orientations but part of, clues to, a basic view of politics. Presumably also
they influence leadership attitudes and performance, helping explain the variance
which occurs in the attitudes and behavior of such leadership. Finally, we assume
that cultural and systemic differences influence the pattern of elite conflict
perceptions and evaluations that emerge when we do comparative analysis.
The history of scholarly discussion of social and political conflict is rich, and many
great minds have addressed themselves to the &dquo;big questions&dquo; posed here. Robert
Angell argued that for sociologists the beginning was Georg Simmel, particularly his
piece on &dquo;The Sociology of Conflict&dquo; (1904). Some American political scientists
would probably take us back to The Federalist in which Madison discussed the
inevitability of &dquo;factions,&dquo; at the time of the adoption of the US Constitution. Putnam
thinks we should go back to the disagreement between Plato and Aristotle over the
essence of social relations (Putnam, 1973: 93-4); others would start with the
contrasting views of Hobbes and Marx. Elite theorists might well call our attention
to the works of Mosca and Pareto, who recognized the conflict of interests in society,
at least implicitly, while arguing for the eventual resolution of conflict leading to a
new &dquo;balance of social forces&dquo; or a societal &dquo;equilibrium.&dquo; In the post-war years
quite a few studies dealing with the subject of conflict appeared (see among others
UNESCO, 1957; Coleman, 1957; Coser, 1956; Dahrendorf, 1959, 1969; Lipset, 1960;
McNeil, 1965; Gamson, 1968; Janowitz, 1970).
In the last decade there seems to have been less attention paid to the study of
conflict internal to society than in the preceding decade and a half. More attention
has been given recently to arms control, deterrence, and international conflict theory.
Our limited exposure to this body of literature leads us to suggest, rather
hesitatingly, that many of the key issues raised by these scholars are still with us.
Most people will agree with Dahrendorf’s initial position, &dquo;Wherever there is human
life, there is conflict ... ,&dquo; but not everyone will agree with his second position, &dquo;by
conflict alone the multitude and incompatibility of human interests and desires find
adequate expression in a world of notorious uncertainty&dquo; (Dahrendorf, 1969: 138-
40). That is, the first issue concerns how we should view the role of conflict in
society-inevitable and positive, or unnecessary and negative, at best only to be
tolerated. Angell reminds us that great scholars like Parsons in The Social System made
conflict &dquo;appear as deviant or abnormal&dquo; (McNeil: 104). And Harold Lasswell is
considered by some to have had less than a positive view of conflict, arguing at one
point that &dquo;the problem of politics is less to solve conflicts than to prevent them ...&dquo;
(Lasswell, 1930: 197). Sperlich (1971: 219) argues that David Truman’s only real
interest in conflict was in its resolution in order to achieve group cohesion. There
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have emerged therefore, two contrasting views of the place of conflict in society-
one emphasizing the negative and dysfunctional aspects of conflict and the other
taking a more &dquo;balanced&dquo; view, seeing at least some positive aspects (Sperlich, 1971:
215). Some scholars feel that we have turned of late more in the direction of the
former view. As Robert Dahl put it, there has developed a &dquo;stability fetish&dquo; among
American political scientists, emphasizing the needs of a stable democracy and seeing
&dquo;conflict and change&dquo; as &dquo;menacing the foundations of existing democracy itself’
(Dahl, 1967: 261).
A related second area of controversy is over the function of conflict. Among those
who are not entirely negative there has been, again, considerable disagreement. Some
scholars defend conflict as necessary for the achievment of consensus, for mainte-
nance of the system. To Dahrendorf this was quite wrong. In one paper he attacked
Coser on this point, arguing that while conflict may lead to the effectiveness of a
system, that is not its sole purpose. Its value is that it leads to social change. He asks
this critical question: &dquo;Is the only sociologically relevant consequence of a strike or
even of a revolution that it constitutes a tie between the hostile parties?&dquo; The answer
for him is a resounding No-conflict is relevant in order to change the system for
the better. (&dquo;Die Functionen Sozialer Konflikte,&dquo; 1962, discussed in McNeil, 104).
Obviously many other functional arguments can, and have been, advanced to
support the role of conflict. It is an area, however, over which there is great
disagreement.
A third area of controversy is what our expectations should be concerning elite
conflict, or rather, variations in the patterns of conflict among elites. This, too, is
both a normative and an analytical question, as were the preceding two questions.
Eldersveld has argued elsewhere that there are three major approaches to this
question of elite relationships (1981: 3-8). There are those who have emphasized
elite cohesion as the reality, writing of a &dquo;ruling class&dquo; or a &dquo;power elite.&dquo; There are
those who have emphasized elite conflict as natural and to be expected, as Weber
speaks of the inevitable conflict between politician and bureaucrat. And there are
those who emphasize elite convergence of perspectives, cooperation, mutual respect,
and rapport, despite differences in views and beliefs-such as the theory of elite
&dquo;accommodationism.&dquo;
In the seven-nation study of MP’s and bureaucrats, two models are presented: (1)
the &dquo;governance model,&dquo; which postulates &dquo;a monistic public interest,&dquo; whose
adherents see social and political conflict as &dquo;marginal, illusory, and often artificial&dquo;;
and (2) the &dquo;politics model&dquo; which &dquo;endorses a pluralistic conception of the public
interest and affirms the reality and legitimacy of conflict&dquo; (Aberbach et al. 1981: 141-
2). Somewhat akin to this distinction is the one made by Gamson between &dquo;potential
partisans&dquo; and &dquo;the authorities,&dquo; the former who do not have power emphasize the
importance of conflict for the articulation of needs and problems, while &dquo;the
authorities&dquo; who are the agents of control take a dim view of conflict (Gamson, 1968:
2). These formulations strongly suggest differences in elite conflict orientations as a
result of power position and role, as expressed in and influenced by the political
culture. They suggest, also, hypotheses we should test with our data.
There is considerable attention paid to these theoretical concerns in the writings
of Polish scholars. They tend to share an opinion that conflicts have hampered social
and economic development in postwar Poland. For example, Jan Szczepanski, a
leading Polish sociologist, has described the elements determining (and limiting) the
changes in the economy and society of Poland, with special reference to the role of
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conflicts, as follows:
The failures in managing the socialized economy, the errors in planning and
implementing economic policies, led to conflicts between the management and the
workers, which contributed to poor performance and created barriers to economic
progress. Even more importantly, they had negative effects upon the behaviour
of the people, the functioning of the state institutions and enterprises, and last but
not least, upon relations between the administration and the people (Szczepanski,
1984: 179).
In another part of his essay Szczepanski answers the question &dquo;What next?&dquo; by
responding that &dquo;the answers vary a good deal.&dquo; Some stress the internal conflicts
... which prevent the evolution of a common programme and exacerbate the
difficulties in mobilizing the society to pursue some common goal or to undertake
some work which would give meaning to its life.&dquo; He adds: &dquo;Some historians will
argue that this has been so for centuries, and that this is almost the normal state of
affairs in Poland&dquo; (Szczepanski, 1984: 185).
Perceptions of conflict as a hampering factor also prevail in the &dquo;Kubiak Report&dquo;
(a document prepared in 1983 by the special commission of the Central Committee
of the Polish United Workers’ Party). This report seeks to explain the causes and
content of social conflicts in Poland after World War II. This official document
reflects the point of view of the ruling party and its ideological and political approach
to social conflicts. An awareness of this approach is especially important in the
analysis of local leaders’ attitudes toward conflict. We can assume that their attitudes
are shaped, or are at least influenced, by the ideology of the party of which they are
members and which they represent. (A majority of local leaders, about 80 percent,
are members of the PUWP.) This report states: &dquo;The rightness of the choice of the
socialist road has been ... confirmed by the lasting and irreversible accomplishments
of the nation, regardless of the errors which were committed along this road and the
accompanying tensions and social conflicts&dquo; (Sprawozdanie Specjalnej Komisji KC
PZPR, 1983).
Polish scholars and party leaders thus emphasize the existence of conflicts,
resulting from managerial decisions and social tensions. They see these conflicts as
dysfunctional, having negative behavioral consequences and impeding development
of the system. Such conflicts may be seen as ideologically improper. Such conflicts
may also be seen as possibly reflecting historical and cultural tendencies.
What emerges from this review of some of the theoretical positions in the United
States and Poland is the expectation that the elites in the United States and Poland
will differ in their orientations toward conflict. Yet, implicit in such writing is the
expectation also that there may be considerable variance in elite conflict beliefs in
both countries. The follow-up question then is what types of leaders are pro-conflict
or anti-conflict in each system, in perceptions, evaluations, and personal preferences?
Are the bureaucrats more, or less, conflict-tolerant than the politicians? Are those in
the older cadres of elites more hostile, or less hostile, to conflict than the new,
younger, elites? And how does &dquo;party&dquo; play a role-in Poland is there a &dquo;party line&dquo;
which members adhere to, while this is not true for non-members? In the United
States are elites on the &dquo;left&dquo; more conflict-tolerant than those on the &dquo;right&dquo;? These
and other questions will engage our attention as we sort out the comparative
uniformities and contrasts in our data.
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Earlier Empirical Research
A brief summary of the results of the earlier empirical work is useful to set the stage
for our analysis. First, the extent to which political elites are aware of, or emphasize,
conflict varies considerably from one system to the next. In Putnam’s early study of
British and Italian MP’s he notes at the beginning the sizeable difference in this
concern about conflict-38 percent of the British MP’s de-emphasize it (49 percent
see conflict as typical or dominant) while only 10 percent of the Italian MP’s de-
emphasize it (75 percent see it as dominant or typical). In our seven-nation study
we see the same pattern of system differences. When we coded our national elites on
the prominence of conflict of interest in their perceptions of politics and society, we
found a wide range. Among MP’s the percentage who saw little conflict varied as
follows: Germany (11), Italy (17), The Netherlands (22), UK and USA (32), France
(53), Sweden (55).
The data for the bureaucrats followed the same basic pattern with the Dutch least
sanguine (11 percent) and the French most sanguine (61 percent). These are sizeable
system differences and have to be understood in terms of the history and development
of these societies in the last 60 years during which these elites have come to adulthood
and political leadership positions.
The relevance of role or position by itself is not as great as one might expect, in
our seven-nation study of bureaucrats and politicians, in the way these two elites
look at politics and society. Politicians are somewhat more likely to see conflict and
to say that conflict is typical, but the differences are not great (on the average 49
percent compared to 46 percent). As to whether conflict is healthy and contributes
to progress, the differences are greater. For example, in The Netherlands while 52
percent of the MP’s see conflict as functional to progress only 32 percent of the senior
bureaucrats do. The comparable percentages for British elites are 70 percent and 55
percent. However, this is not true for all countries (Germany is an exception-both
civil servants and MP’s are equal in their support of the positive function of conflict,
up to 70 percent seeing it as linked to progress).
The importance of party and ideology as explanations of elite conflict orientations
has been examined. Putnam found in his early study that &dquo;Leftists stress conflict,
rightists stress harmony&dquo; (Putnam, 1973: 106). Yet his data suggest (as he admits)
that the far Right is almost as aware of conflict, sensitive and concerned about it, as
the Left. This was only slightly more true in Italy than in Britain. Hence to claim
that &dquo;politicians of the Right are typically consensualists&dquo; (129) is difficult to support
with his data. Our seven-nation study is more convincing on this point. Our data
reveal the following: the mean percent who see little conflict in society is 14 percent
for the Left but 43 percent for the Center/Right. Yet, by country, again, there are
great differences, as shown in Table I (Eldersveld, 1981: 240). Table I suggests that
the party variable may not always be useful in explaining variations in conflict
perceptions.
Other personal sources for explaining leaders’ variations have not been explored
as carefully, with the exception of social class origins. Putnam argues that father’s
occupation as well as respondent’s own occupational history correlate well with the
conflict perceptions of elites. In Britain the parental social class association with
conflict is 0.43, and respondents own occupation correlates as 0.34. In Italy, because
parental social class data were hard to secure, the correlation was strong only for
respondent’s first and most recent occupation (0.34). Hence the argument is that the
lower the social class of origin the greater the likelihood that a political leader will
314
Table 1. Conflict Perceptions of National Politicians, by Party
operate with a conflict model of politics. This finding holds up even if party is
controlled, which suggests that the political and social conflict orientation is very
deeply held, developed early in life, and retained despite subsequent partisan and
political ideological influences. Linked to this position is a &dquo;generational&dquo; interpreta-
tion of the way in which political leaders are socialized to the acceptance of a conflict
(or non-conflict) model of politics. They presumably &dquo;take on&dquo; an interpretation of
politics by the time they reach adulthood, and the particular historical period of a
society during their period of adolescence, whether a period of conflict and discord
or of harmony and consensus, presumably influences the crystallization of this
conflict view of the world of politics (Putnam, 1973: 146).
A few words are needed to summarize attempts to discuss something about the
consequences of elite conflict orientations. Putnam argues that these are basic
orientations, and influence the way a leader behaves. He seeks to demonstrate that
the leader’s conflict model influences his approach to specific issues and their
resolution (for example, views as to how to handle the problems of crime or poverty).
Further, he sees conflict orientations linked to &dquo;ideological style,&dquo; or how a person
thinks and reasons about politics, whether as a generalist or a particularist,
inductively or deductively, and so on. Third, he sees these orientations as associated
with behavioral roles. The two he uses are the &dquo;tribune&dquo; and the &dquo;trustee&dquo; (the
former focusing on protest and advocacy, the latter focusing on &dquo;the defense of
national and collective interests&dquo;). The correlations are high (0.61 and 0.61 for MP’s
in Britain and Italy). Finally, Putnam and our seven-nation study both see linkages
between conflict orientations and other attitudes. Thus, those elites who see conflict
as &dquo;healthy&dquo; and functional are much more likely to support pluralist politics and
particularly the participatory role of citizens in the system.
Finally, the study Values and the Actiue Community has certain pertinent findings
about elite conflict orientations for Poland and the United States which antedate our
analysis here. The findings shown in Table 2 from the earlier study are particularly
important to keep in mind.
The ISVIP Study discovered that, in explaining community activeness, intensity
of conflict in Poland contributed substantially to the variance explained, an increase
of 31 percent. In the United States the variance explained was only 6 percent (Jacob,
1971: 307). The conclusion arrived at was that leaders believe conflict in Poland &dquo;is
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Table 2. Conflict Perceptions of Local Leaders
a definite hindrance.&dquo; &dquo;Where there is conflict there is less activeness, where the
leaders perceive little conflict andrew obstacles ... the community is active&dquo; (303). In
the United States the conclusion was quite different: &dquo;The leaders in active cities
value participation, whereas leaders in the less active cities value economic
development and the avoidance of conflict&dquo; (303, emphasis supplied). Thus, &dquo;it appears
that socio-political conflict, although operating in quite different ways in each
country, provides one of the more cross-nationally important variables&dquo; (309). Such
earlier findings set the stage for our analysis of the eighties.
The Data
For this exploratory analysis we have tried to match as closely as possible the cities
we select in Poland and the United States. As is well known, we have returned in
1983-84 to the 30 American cities in which the original &dquo;Values Project&dquo; was
conducted in 1966. In each city, from 15 to 30 local governmental, party, civic, and
interest group leaders were interviewed. From that set of cities we selected seven,
primarily in the Midwest, which are close in population size to the five Polish cities
in which interviews were conducted in 1983-84. The reason for the larger number
of US cities was the need for an adequate number of respondents on which to base
a comparison with the Polish data.
In Table 3 we present population data on the cities selected for our comparison.
According to the 1980 census, the Polish cities range from 24 700 to 98 900 in 1980
population; the US cities range from 30 600 to 109 700. All the Polish cities are located
in two provinces, Kalisz and Siedlce. In each province about 250 local leaders were
selected, primarily on the basis of their positions: as party secretaries, presidents of
chapters of the United People’s Party and Democratic Party, presidents and deputy
secretaries of towns, managers of groups of villages, managers of the more important
departments of towns, commission chairmen of town councils, directors of the largest
industrial enterprises, principals of the largest schools. Thus, a diversity of functions
and roles is included in the Polish sample. The provinces, and administrative units
within them, were selected in order to compare communities with higher and lower
levels of economic development and industrialization. &dquo;K&dquo; province was less rural
- 43 percent urban (compared to 25 percent for &dquo;S&dquo; province), had better medical
care facilities, better mass media facilities (TV and radio sets), and better housing
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Table 3. Population of the Polish and American Cities in our Study
Sources: U.S. County and City Data Book, 1977, 1983 U.S. Bureau of the Census
Poland: Statistical Yearbook, 1984, pp. 41 and 43
conditions. As for type of employment, the two provinces were fairly similar: 42
percent to 44 percent employed in industry, 10 percent to 17 percent in transport
and communication, 10 percent to 13 percent in trade.
The American cities did vary in certain important respects. They differed
considerably in median family income and in educational level. At one extreme is
Highland Park, 80 percent or more of whose adult population was fairly well
educated (49 percent college-educated), a city with a high median family income of
$42903 in 1980. At the other extreme on education are cities like Wyandotte and
Hamilton (less than 10 percent with college educations). As for family income
variations, Dothan, Hamilton, and South Bend were lowest in 1980.
The US cities also vary much more than the Polish cities in types of employment
in 1980. Four cities had a third or more of their labor force in manufacturing, while
Highland Park and Dothan were far below that. On the other hand, Highland Park
had over 40 percent of its labor force working in professional, service, or self-
employed positions, compared to 17 percent in Wyandotte. Finally, the proportion
of blacks in these cities varied from less than one percent in Wyandotte, (1.7 percent
in Highland Park) to 25 percent in Dothan (almost 20 percent in Waukegan and
South Bend).
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While important differences exist in these cities, as one would naturally expect,
their population size and economic character suggest enough relative similarity to
permit us to attempt a comparison of them in elite perceptions of conflicts and elite
beliefs about conflict. The Polish study, although focused primarily on the elites’
views of needs and problems, and their satisfaction, did ask questions similar enough
to those in the American study to permit a joint analysis. In the discussion here we
will focus on elite perceptions and attitudes in individual cities in each country and
then aggregate the responses for all elites by country. We will use individual
variables, in an attempt to explain variance in elite orientations. But we will also
describe carefully community differences to see whether elite orientations vary by
type of city.
Community Differences in Problem Orientations in Poland
and the United States
When we scrutinize the data for these two sets of cities two observations strike us
immediately: communities vary greatly and elites within communities, as well as among
communities, vary greatly. Before proceeding with our analysis of the factors
explaining elite perceptions of conflict, this multivaried community context or setting
Table 4. Perceptions of Problems by Local Elites in Poland and the US
* These respondents in the US study said there was only one or no &dquo;very serious&dquo; problem in their communities. There were no Polish
respondents who said there was no serious problem.
** These are averages of the percentages of leaders in each city who mentioned a need or problems as &dquo;very serious&dquo; (US) or as &dquo;very much&dquo;
unsatisfied (Poland).
Notes: Based on: US question - &dquo;Are any of the following issues a problem for your city - very serious, somewhat serious, no problem? (14
issues were listed plus &dquo;other&dquo;).
Polish question - &dquo;What do you think are the most important problems facing your city now?&dquo; (Over 30 problems were coded).
&dquo;To what extent, in your opinion, are the needs of the inhabitants of this town (village) satisfied in the following fields?&dquo; (20 specific
types of needs were referred to). The alternatives used were: quite sufficiently, rather sufficiently, rather insufficiently.
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should be understood. To begin with we should note the differences in problem
orientations by community, using our leaders as informants on this matter. In Table
4 we have arranged our cities on the basis of the perception that the community faces
very serious problems. Over 50 percent of the leaders in Waukegan identify three or
more serious problems confronting their city (47 percent in Hamilton), but in
Wyandotte only 23 percent do, and in Highland Park 64 percent of the leaders see
no serious problems at all. In Poland the variation is not that great, yet elite
perceptions of the seriousness of problems varies also, ranging from 50 percent in
Ostrow to 82 percent in Lukow (who see three or more very serious problems).
Second, the types of problems facing a city are somewhat different. Although
almost 50 percent of US cities’ leaders identify economic problems, the incidence of
this type of problem is very high in Wyandotte (85 percent) and very low in Dothan
and Highland Park, where leaders are more worried about social and service
problems.
In Polish cities there is great variation in types of problems perceived. The
proportion of leaders mentioning economic problems ranges from 37 percent in
Kalisz to 73 percent in Lukow. Service problems are much less likely to be mentioned.
Sixty percent mention housing problems in Kalisz but only 3 percent in Ostrow.
Schools are also a problem in Lukow and Kalisz but not in Jarocin.
Third, the sense of &dquo;effective action&dquo; varies considerably (Table 5). At one extreme
in the American data is Highland Park, 56 percent of whose elites have a sense of
achievement in the solution of problems. Waukegan leaders seem the most frustrated,
only 29 percent seeing effective action (on four or more problems). Other
communities are split, a large minority of leaders feeling no action is occurring on
serious problems.
Table 5. Community Variations in Effective Action on Problems
,Vote: See Table 4 for the questions asked in each survey.
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There is much more concern about lack of effective action among local elites in
Poland. On the average over 50 percent see two or more serious problems not dealt
with effectively (compared to 20 percent for the US local elites). But the variation
in Poland is also considerable on this point-Kalisz’s elite (37 percent) who says
there are four or more serious problems not satisfactorily met, while the percentage
in Ostrow is only 8 percent.
Communities vary also in the conflict perceptions of their elites. Certain US cities
(such as Waukegan) obviously have a great deal of visible conflict, while others (such
as Middletown) seem to have relatively little.
It is clear for the US cities that there are conflicts, that elites are aware of them,
but that they place considerably different weights on these conflicts within the same
community.
The Polish cities do not differ radically from the US cities in the conflict
perceptions of their leaders. At least the proportions mentioning three or more
conflicts as dividing the community are very similar. On the aggregate, 43 percent
of Polish leaders said there were no serious conflicts; for the United States the
proportion was 44 percent. And the comparisons of type of perceived conflicts are
remarkably similar.
The evaluations of conflict which these local leaders have do not differ extremely
in the aggregate (i.e., if we compare all Polish leaders with all American leaders).
(See Table 6). We might have expected greater variance. Conflicts are seen on the
average by 56 percent in the United States as interfering with effective action and
by 23 percent as coming &dquo;very much&dquo; in the way of community development. The
comparable Polish percentage for this latter perception is 31 percent. So far as
personal normative views are concerned, American leaders are generally more pro-
conflict than the Polish (on the six comparable items in our value scale), but not
extremely so, 75 percent compared to 61 percent. The differences by community also
do not seem extreme for either country; in fact, there appears to be considerable
homogeneity in elite value orientations about conflict across these cities if one uses
the overall index. If one inspects the data more carefully, however, one discerns
considerable variation by community on particular value orientations. For example,
for the statement &dquo;a leader should modify his actions to keep consensus,&dquo; we find
the range in agreement for our seven US cities to be from 20 percent to 60 percent
and for our Polish cities to be 45 percent to 77 percent. The average range in pro-
conflict responses for the six items was 21.0 percent for Polish cities and 30.5 percent
for US cities, suggesting greater intercity variation in the United States.
This leads us to the question of elite consensus, or the integration of communities
at the elite level (Table 7). There are different ways to operationalize elite consensus
and dissensus, of course. One approach is to ask whether the elites agree on which
(and how many) problems, if any, are the most serious. One sees, following this
criterion, no great elite homogeneity in the US cities, with the possible exception of
Highland Park. The elites in our samples are quite clearly split on the number of
problems which are serious: 50-50, 60-40, or 80-20. There is less disagreement on
the type of major problems referred to. The great majority will agree that at least one
key problem is &dquo;unemployment,&dquo; or &dquo;economic development,&dquo; or &dquo;social services,&dquo;
or the need for &dquo;public improvements.&dquo; But there is disagreement over the number
and type of other problems which are serious. On the question of effective action,
again, one sees the same types of splits. That is, in Hamilton, for example, 50 percent
of the leaders say effective action is negligible, and 50 percent say it is significant.
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Table 6. Community Variations in Elite Evaluations of Political Conflict: the US and Poland
Questions (US): &dquo;In many communities there are conflicts which interfere with effective action to meet community
problems. Are there some major conflicts that interfere with getting things done in your community?&dquo;
&dquo;To what extent do these conflicts come in the way of the development of your community?&dquo;
Questions (Poland): &dquo;Do these conflicts in your opinion (I) obstruct the development of this area (2) promote the
development of this area (3) have no influence on the development of this area?
In Middletown it is a 58-42 split. Only in Highland Park is this irrelevant, since
such a large proportion of elites say there simply are no serious problems. Sizeable
proportions present contrasting evaluations of the role conflicts play in the action
process. Even in Highland Park, elites differ clearly in how they evaluate conflict.
The Polish data are strikingly different in that there is high elite agreement on the
number of serious problems-on the average only 7 percent disagreement (compared
to 35 percent for the US cities). But as to the question of effective action and whether
conflicts interfere with development, the elite dissensus is not much different on the
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Table 7. Elite Consensus in US and Polish Cities
*Those who say conflict plays no role (harmful or helpful) are not included here.
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average than in the United States. The differences by cities, again, are considerable,
almost as great in Poland as in the United States on effective action responses and
greater in Poland than in the United States on whether conflicts are harmful. Thus
one finds great elite diversity in problem and conflict perspectives by community in both
systems.
Let us attempt a summary of the differences in these two systems for the two
clusters of cities included in this analysis (see Table 8). These data suggest that the
basic differences between the local elites in these two systems occur over their
perceptions of the seriousness of community problems, the types of such problems,
and whether effective action is being taken. In addition, US elites are somewhat more
pro-conflict in value preferences. But the data on conflict perceptions are very similar,
as is the level of elite consensus.
Polish cities face a variety of problems and conflicts. What seems clear is that a
large number of local leaders are concerned with &dquo;unsatisfied needs,&dquo; reflecting the
Table 8. S’ummary of Differences in the Two Systems
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very difficult economic and social situation of the early 198Us. Yet cities vary in their
leaders’ perceptions of problems and needs. Three factors appear to be particularly
related to this variation: the role of a city in a province, the economic development
status of a province, and the depth of the political crisis of the 1980s. Leaders in the
provincial capitals (Kalisz and Siedlce) report a higher number of serious problems.
This is not surprising, because of their greater dependence on centrally distributed
goods (such as food, construction of apartment buildings) plus the different
expectations in the larger urban communities (such as day-care centers, hospitals).
While almost all leaders (over 90 percent) mention at least one economic problem,
leaders in the provincial capitals are more concerned with social problems, especially
to do with educational-cultural needs. Then, too, one must note that in the less
developed province (&dquo;S&dquo; province) the number of needs and serious problems
perceived is higher. It is necessary to remember that need perception reflects not only
the objective situation but also aspirations based on promises which may be
unfulfilled. Thus in Kalisz the lack of a local university branch and an unfinished
hospital (under construction for years) influenced local leaders’ opinions.
A particularly relevant consideration in Poland may be leaders’ perceptions of their
autonomy in handling local problems. On 18 different types of problems the five
cities range, in the percentage of their elites who feel that they do not have enough
power to deal with the problem, from 80 percent who say they are constrained on
hospital construction, 74 percent on construction of schools, 70 percent on housing
construction, 64 percent on clothing supply, 55 percent on the supply of food, to 12
percent in the administration of municipal services and 15 percent in their control
of cultural activities. On many of the most critical economic needs, therefore, leaders
feel they cannot be effective, which is certainly reflected in their perceptions of the
problems and need situation in their communities. There is some variation by
community in these levels of perceived lack of power. Kalisz leaders apparently sense
greater autonomy-only 41 percent feel lack of power in supplying food, 56 percent
in supplying clothing-but in other areas of need the leaders of Kalisz, too, seem to
lack authority to do much. Thus, 81 percent of the leaders are frustrated over the
lack of autonomy to proceed with hospital and school construction and 78 percent
report no power to move ahead locally with housing construction.
As for conflict perceptions, the local elites of the two largest cities of Kalisz province
(Kalisz and Ostrow) see more conflicts than the leaders of the smaller cities and of
the cities in Siedlce province. This can be explained by the particularly strong
political conflicts in these two cities at the beginning of the 1980s, which contributed
to leaders’ awareness of many problems. Yet we note also the tendency of large
numbers of Polish local leaders to deny the existence of conflicts. These results in
our present study compare with the earlier results from the Polish study of 30
administrative districts in 1966, the study of six towns in 1977, and the 1978-80
study in these same provinces. The conclusion reached in 1982 was that:
The political consciousness of a large sector of local authorities is marked by a
tendency to deny the existence of conflicts within the local community and to
negate the importance of social diflerences. In 1978-80 some 28 to 30 percent of
the leaders ... claimed that there were no conflicts ....In 1966 only 15 percent
of local leaders maintained that there were no conflicts ... [suggesting] the
tendency of the leaders not to perceive local conflicts increased from the mid-1960s
to the mid-1970s (that tendency was reversed in the summer of 1980 in &dquo;S&dquo;
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province) ....The data gathered by the Public Opinion Research Centre of Polish
Radio and Television (OBOPISP) reveal that Polish society at large showed an
increased tendency to perceive negative differences and conflicts in the mid-1970s
as compared with the early 1960s.
This tendency to deny the existence of conflict and to make little of the
importance of social differences which is typical of the leaders, can be explained
by their acceptance of an ideology, connected with their group interest, which
assumes the vanishing of class difl~erences and conflicts in socialist society. (The
ideological sources of this tendency can be inferred from the fact that it is more
often observed in people working in the PUWP apparatus.) It seems, however,
that it is also intensified by the conventional normative structures: orientation
toward interpersonal harmony, law and order. It is obvious that the denial or even
the belittling of conflict in a situation where it is commonly held that conflict is
increasing cannot be considered rational. Given such a situation, rational action
requires an institutional settling of conflicts, and this necessitates the admission
that conflict is both real and unavoidable. (Jasinska and Siemienska, 1982).
Differences in income are still important sources of conflict in Poland, particularly
visible in cities with higher levels of economic development. Differences in trade
union membership (mainly &dquo;Solidarity&dquo;) before December 13, 1981 (the imposition
of martial law), and manual compared to non-manual workers are also perceived
sources of conflict. It is necessary to point out that differences in political views were
more often considered a source of conflict than party membership.
Conflict evaluation responses in Polish cities have changed somewhat over the
years. Fewer local leaders see conflicts as harmful: in &dquo;K&dquo; province 48 percent were
anti-conflict in the 1970s, compared to 35 percent in the present study. The leaders
in the large provincial capitals are more likely to be critical of conflict. Yet few leaders
admit that conflict can be helpful, which is understandable if one recalls the position
taken in party documents, which we mentioned earlier in the introduction. It is clear
that most local leaders share the opinion that a condition of economic and social
development is achieved by social integration and by mobilization around commonly
accepted goals, that is goals formulated by the party whose leading role is constantly
stressed.
Individual Level Analysis
While there can be no doubt that social and economic conditions as well as the
conditions of political life in a community influence elite attitudes toward conflict,
that is not the complete story. A major question is whether there are characteristics
of leaders which predispose them to certain approaches to conflict despite the
community, whether there are uniformities across communities which we can
discover. Other studies referred to earlier suggest that this may be the case. We will
use here four individual level characteristics on which we have data for both
countries.
The first theoretical concern relates to leadership position or role. The national
elite study found that administrators were more concerned, indeed negative, about
conflict than MP’s. The question is whether we find this to be the case at the city
level. The answer is a qualified yes (see Table 9). In the United States, department









































members, but they evaluated conflict somewhat more negatively. As for their
personal value position, administrators were more inclined to argue for resolving
conflicts as the top priority. But the differences are not great in the United States.
In Poland, administrators actually see fewer conflicts than do the party politicians
(although there is considerable homogeneity in the perceptions of all local leaders in
this study). Polish administrators are more concerned about the harmfulness of
conflicts (50 percent compared to 31 percent for the party politicians). What is
surprising is that the latter, the members of the party apparatus, are so tolerant of
conflict. The complete data for Poland reveal that 54 percent of the party people see
conflicts as irrelevant to development (compared to 30 percent for administrators).
It may be that these administrators are new members, only recently appointed to
the local position. As to personal value positions, the Polish leaders of all types are
much more anti-conflict than in the United States-Polish administrators 46 percent
(US 14 percent); Polish party officials 40 percent (US 7 percent). This is a major
cross-national difference, but our data do not indicate that the type of position a
leader holds is a major explanatory variable in understanding his or her conflict
orientations.
Party affiliation, a second factor, conceivably should play an important role in elite
conflict orientations in both countries. The national elite studies in the West found
conservative parliamentarians to be more pro-harmony, more concerned about
conflict, than politicians on the &dquo;left.&dquo; These local elite data do not support that
finding at all, however. In the United States, Republican leaders see less conflict than
either the Democrats or Independents, are less inclined to say it interferes with
community progress, and personally espouse a value position which is significantly
more pro-conflict. These American cities varied considerably in the partisan
character of their elite samples at the time of our study-from 78 percent Democratic
in South Bend, 57 percent Democratic in Waukegan, to a 43 percent Democratic and
21 percent Republican split in Highland Park, to 71 percent Republican in
Middletown. Yet the Republicans seem consistently more tolerant of conflict.
In Poland one could argue either that party members should be less tolerant of
conflict, and that therefore these findings are surprising, or that non-members would
be expected to be more aware of conflict and more interested in seeing the need for
social, if not political, consensus. More reflection as well as analysis of these data,
probably in detail for each city, will be necessary to interpret these findings fully.
Length of tenure in leadership position seems to be only marginally related to elite
conflict views. The Polish elites, paradoxically, are more inclined to see conflict as
harmful if they have been in their positions most recently, for a short time (i.e. in
the 1980-83 period), but they are somewhat more inclined to be personally tolerant
of conflict than those who have been in position for a longer period. The American
elites who have come into office only recently are somewhat less aware of conflict
but more inclined to see it as harmful (as is the case for the Polish elites). Yet, tenure
seems to be irrelevant to their own personal value position (which is somewhat
contrary to the finding for Polish leaders).
Since the tenure variable is related to the age variable it makes sense here to
compare these findings. Again, there are no very clear differences to be found. If one
contrasts the youngest cadre and the oldest cadre one discovers one similarity cross-
nationally-the youngest elites are most likely to say there are no serious conflicts.
Beyond that one finds only differences in the two systems: the youngest US elites are
most inclined to see conflicts as harmful to the community (while in Poland the oldest
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elites do); the youngest US elites are somewhat more personally tolerant of conflict
(while in Poland the oldest elites are more tolerant). The findings for the intermediate
age groups reveal no linear set of relationships.
Concluding Observations
There are several surprising, if not troublesome, findings in this comparative analysis.
We find, as expected, that the cities in both Poland and the United States are
confronted by serious problems and conflicts and that there is genuine concern by
elites as to whether effective action is being taken. What is surprising is the degree
of cross-national uniformity in some of our findings. While it is true that the evidence
of serious problems in Poland is reported at a higher level than in the United States,
we find the types of problems reported to be similar. For example, there is evidence
of serious economic problems, which are mentioned by 48 percent of the respondents
in the United States and by 55 percent in Poland. As to the amount and types of
serious conflict in their communities, both sets of elites, in the aggregate, are
similar-roughly 55 percent see considerable conflict, and for certain categories of
conflict the proportions are almost equal (conflicts over income status-21 percent
and 22 percent; conflict over political views-17 percent and 12 percent). Further,
similar percentages of those leaders see conflicts as harmful to community
development: 23 percent in the US sample, 31 percent in the Polish sample. Elite
dissensus by community in each country is similar also, between 30 percent and 40
percent. In our individual level analysis we found some cross-national uniformities
also. Thus bureaucrats see conflict as more harmful than politicians; as for personal
value orientations, the politicians are more conflict-tolerant in both systems.
One would have expected more evidence of system-specific differences in these
&dquo;most different systems.&dquo; There are indeed certain unique findings for each country.
The youngest cadre in Poland is relatively much more pro-conflict than the older
elites, while the reverse is true in the United States. The party members in Poland
are much more pro-conflict than one would have expected given the party’s
ideological dogma on conflict. Republicans in the United States are more tolerant of
conflict than the Democrats, and less concerned about the harmful consequences of
conflict. But these are specific findings which do not overcome one’s surprise at the
basic pattern of cross-national uniformities in the findings. One might have expected
that in Poland the greater drive for consensus and harmony by the system would be
Table 10. Comparison over Time of Value Orientations of Elites
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manifest in a set of elite responses on conflict perceptions, conflict evaluations, and
personal conflict value orientations-particularly by the established party elite.
Rather, we find the local Polish elites converging more toward the American model
of local politics: much perceived conflict, relative ambivalence as to its harmfulness,
great tolerance of conflict in terms of personal value position.
The comparison with the 1966 ISVIP data is interesting in this respect (see Table
10). Although one must be cautious with these data and remember the smaller
number of cities included in the 1980-84 study, the &dquo;convergence&dquo; trend is
suggestive.
In one final respect the two systems are similar-there are great variations by local
communities in types of problems, types of conflicts, and in elite orientations to these
problems and conflicts, in their communities. It is these within-system variations, as
within-elite dissensus, that best characterize local political elite cultures in these two
systems. As Lasswell said long ago, &dquo;Elite studies are the heart of research into the
world revolution of our time!&dquo;
Note
1. This study, known as ISVIP (International Study of Values in Politics, Jacob, 1971) will
be referred to here as the "Values Project."
References
Aberbach, J., et al. (1981). Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies. Cambridge, MA.:
Harvard University Press.
Coleman, J. (1957). Community Conflict. New York: The Free Press.
Coser, L. (1956). The Function of Social Conflict. New York: The Free Press.
Dahl, R. (1967). Pluralist Democracy in the U.S.: Conflict and Consent. Chicago: Rand-McNally.
Dahrendorf, R. (1959). Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society. Stanford, CA.: Stanford
University Press.
Dahrendorf, R. (1969). Society and Democracy in Germany. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
Eldersveld, S. J. (1981). Elite Images of Dutch Politics. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan
Press.
Gamson, W. A. (1968). Power and Discontent. Homewood, IL: The Dorsey Press.
Jacob, P., et al. (1971). Values and the Active Community. New York: The Free Press.
Janowitz, M. (1970). Political Conflict. Chicago: Quadrangle Books.
Jasinska, A. and R. Siemienska (1982). "Local Authorities Prior to the Crisis of 1980." Sisyphus,
III.
Lasswell, H. (1930). Psychopathology and Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Lipset, S. M. (1960). Political Man. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
McNeil, E. B., ed. (1965). The Nature of Human Conflict. New York: Prentice Hall.
Putnam, R. (1973). The Beliefs of Politicians. New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press.
Siemienska, R. (1984). "Popular Demands and Leadership Responses in Periods of Economic
Retreat: A Case Study of Poland." Presented at the International Conference on
Comparative Studies on Values and Fulfillment of Needs by Local Governments in Jablonna
(Poland).
Simmel, G. (1904). "The Sociology of Conflict." American Journal of Sociology. IX.
Sperlich, P. (1971). Conflict and Harmony in Human Affairs. Chicago: Rand-McNally.
Sprawozdanie z prac komisji KC PZPR powolanej dla wyja&sacute;nienia przyczyn i przebiegu
konflikt&oacute;w spolecznych w dziejach Polski Ludonej (Report of the Special Commission of the
329
the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party). (1983). Nowe Drogi, Special
Issue.
Szczepanski, J. (1984). "Poland 1984: Reflections upon Forty Years of Development." In
Eastern Europe in the Aftermath of Solidarity (Adam Bromke, ed.) New York: Columbia
University Press.
UNESCO Report (1957). The Nature of Conflict.
Biographical Notes
SAMUEL ELDERSVELD has taught at the University of Michigan for over forty years,
publishing in the fields of political party systems, comparative political behavior, and
political elites, national and local. He is currently doing a comparative study of local
political elites in the United States, Sweden, and The Netherlands. ADDRESS:
Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, 5601 Haven Hall, Ann
Arbor, MI. 48104, USA.
RENATA SIEMIENSKA teaches at the Institute of Sociology at the University of Warsaw.
She has lectured widely in Poland, Europe, and the United States. Her research has
focused on many different political and social problems in Poland, including cultural
and social change, women and politics, gender sociology, comparative socialization,
and local government. She recently co-authored a book on Poland, entitled Local
Authorities at the Time of the Crisis (1987). ADDRESS: Institute of Sociology and
Philosophy, University of Warsaw, 00 330 Palace Staszica, Warsaw, Poland.
